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Abstract—This paper presents a detailed description of an
advanced Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system implemented
on a Renault-Volvo Trucks vehicle. One of the main differences
between this new system, which is called the Smart Distance
Keeping (SDK), and the classical ACC is the choice of the safe
distance. This later is the distance between the vehicle (with
the ACC or the SDK system) and the front obstacle (which
may be a vehicle). It is supposed fix in the case of the ACC,
while variable in the case of the SDK. The variation of this
distance (in the case of SDK) depends essentially on the relative
velocity between the vehicle and the front obstacle. The choice
of this distance influences the velocity regulation. The main
contribution of this work is on the SDK system architecture,
the design of its environment model, and the proposition of a
detection and isolation strategy for some of the possible faults
that may be produced on the system.
Keywords-Smart Distance Keeping (SDK), vehicle modeling,
fault diagnosis.
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of vehicles are being equipped
with adaptive cruise control (ACC). This technology is
substantially more complex than conventional cruise con-
trol; ACC adjusts the brake and/or throttle, within limited
ranges, to maintain a constant headway from any vehicle
that intrudes upon the path of the driver’s vehicle. While
ACC provides a potential safety benefit in helping drivers
to maintain a constant speed and headway [1], as with
other types of automation, there is the potential for misuse
and disuse [2]. Adaptive cruise control (ACC) provides
assistance to the driver in the task of longitudinal control of
his vehicle during motorway driving. The system controls
the accelerator, engine power train and vehicle brakes to
maintain a desired time-gap to the vehicle ahead.
For ACC to be effective, drivers need to understand the
capabilities of the technology, which include braking and
sensor limitations. Based on this understanding, they must
be able to intervene when a given situation exceeds ACC
capabilities. However, drivers have difficulties in understand-
ing how ACC functions [3]. As a result, they tend to rely
on the system inappropriately. For instance, [4] showed
that drivers failed to intervene when approaching a stopped
queue of vehicles because they believed that the ACC
could effectively respond to the situation. [6] introduced an
unexpected acceleration into the ACC system during routine
driving conditions, which resulted in a collision 33 percent
of the time. Whether or not drivers can respond effectively
when automation fails depends on their understanding of the
type of failure that occurs and the context in which it occurs
[5].
To ensure safe and effective use, ACC limits of operation
should be identifiable and interpretable [7]. One approach to
help drivers detect and respond to these limits is to match
the limits of the ACC algorithm to the natural boundaries
drivers use to switch between car-following and active
braking behaviors, as defined by environmental cues [e.g.
time headway (THW) and time to collision (TTC)].
Essentially, this means matching the function of the ACC
to the way drivers perform the task of following other vehi-
cles [7]. Individual differences in driving behavior, however,
would require some degree of tuning of the ACC algorithm
to individual drivers.
The SDK must be understood as a function to enhance the
driver’s capability to manage his longitudinal environment,
and is dedicated to a use on highways or expressways
(straight line, low curvatures, one-way roads). The SDK is
based on the immediate front environment sensing on one
hand, and on the automated management of the truck lon-
gitudinal actuators (brakes, engine, gearbox), all this being
monitored and controllable at any time by the driver through
the in-cabin human machine interface and the conventional
driving commands (pedals, switches).
Sensor outputs should always be checked to ensure that
they are within their expected operating range. Simple
checks on the recent rate of change or variance of the output
can also be incorporated. Faults which cause the sensor to
have an offset or altered gain will affect the control system
but may not be detected by this first level approach.
The traditional approach to sensor fault checking is to
include hardware redundancy for sensors. If two sensors
measuring the same quantity disagree, there is likely to be
a fault in one of them, and if three or more measurements
are available, the fault is likely to be in the sensor which
disagrees most.
The high cost of providing direct hardware redundancy for
sensors has led to the development of analytic redundancy
techniques. Conceptually, this equates to creating virtual
sensors from other available measurements, to compare with
the one being monitored. Analytic redundancy is used in
available passenger car control systems.
The paper is structured as: first we begin by a general
description and modeling of the SDK controller with its
environment system. The modeling in this work includes
a simplified mathematical model of the wheels and the
engine. Then, a strategy for the detection and the isolation
of the some of the possible faults that may be produced
on the overall system is shown. Finally test scenarios and
conclusion are presented.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND MODELING
A. SDK System
In our work, we are interested on the modeling and the
diagnosis of the SDK system. On the diagnosis part, we con-
centrate on the sensors fault diagnosis (truck velocity sensor,
wheels angular velocity sensors, radar, engine sensors). We
suppose during this study that no faults may be produced
on the bus CAN or on coding the algorithms (software).
The main architecture of the global system can be rep-
resented by figure 1. As shown in this figure, the global
SDK system may be decomposed into two main parts, the
SDK controller, and the SDK environment model. The main
function of the SDK controller is to:
∙ find the minimal distance between the truck and the
front object,
∙ find the acceleration (deceleration) needed to realize the
correct functioning of the SDK system,
∙ use a control algorithm to control the engine.
Inputs to the controller:
∙ relative velocity between the SDK vehicle and the front
vehicle,
∙ distance between the SDK vehicle and the front vehicle,
∙ type of the front object (moving or not moving object),
∙ velocity of the SDK vehicle which may be found by
one of the following ways:
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Figure 1. SDK system: algorithm and environment
– a velocity sensor (Tachograph, or from the trans-
mission system),
– the average value of wheels angular velocity mea-
surements.
Outputs from the controller:
∙ control of the injection system,
∙ information sent to the Human Machine Interface about
the status of the SDK system.
By showing this architecture, we see that the decision of the
SDK controller depends essentially on the data issued from
some sensors, which means, any faulty data, will influence
the SDK system decision.
In order to avoid as maximum as possible the faulty data
propagation, we analyze in this work the following element:
the radar, the wheel, the engine, and the communication
buses.
1) The Radar: The SDK needs to be informed about the
front object presence, and about its relative position and
velocity. Within this work, the sensor is a 3 beam Doppler
effect ARS100 Radar. This radar monitors the traffic in front
of the vehicle using three stationary independent millimetre
wave radar.
Moving and stationary objects are detected and their
distance and relative velocity are measured and processed
sixteen times per second.
Due to its physical nature, the radar sensor is offering ex-
cellent performance characteristics even in adverse weather
conditions.
Since the data issued from the radar depends on the
external object, then in order to realize any simulation,
several scenarios should be prepared for the movement SDK
vehicle and the front object. In this work, we suppose that the
distance and the relative velocity between the SDK vehicle
and the front vehicle are inputs to the system (depending on
the scenarios that we are choosing).
2) The Wheels: Wheel angular velocity is one of the
important inputs to the SDK controller. Based on the angular
velocities (six wheels), the linear truck velocity is calculated.
In this part, the wheel rotational dynamics are presented.
By applying Newton’s Law to the dynamics of the wheels,
we find:
퐼푤푖푤˙푖 = 푅푖퐹푋푖 + 푇표푟푞푢푒(푚푖)− 푇표푟푞푢푒(푏푖) (1)
Where 퐼푤푖 is the moment of inertia of the wheel number
푖, 푅푖 is the effective radius, 푤푖 is the angular velocity of
the wheel, 푇표푟푞푢푒(푚푖) is the applied tractive torque, and
푇표푟푞푢푒(푏푖) is the braking torque.
B. Motor and Power Train
Modern diesel engines are essentially decomposed into
several subsystems [10]: the exhaust manifold, the intake
manifold, the injection (common rail), the engine with
moving solids (rods, pistons, cylinders ...), the turbo charge.
Each of these subsystems can be modeled separately, but for
some of these subsystems it is difficult to develop analytical
models, so static maps based on the knowledge about the
system may be used.
The presented problem in this section is to develop a
simplified model for the diesel engine (see figure 2) used
by the SDK. Based on [10], the dynamics of motor rotation
is given by (2).
퐽푒푤˙푒(푡) =푀푖푛푑(푡− 휏푖)−푀푓 (푡)−푀푙표푎푑(푡) (2)
Where 푤푒 is the crank shaft angular velocity, 푀푖푛푑 is the
indicated torque, 휏푖 is the delay, 푀푓 (푡) is the friction torque,
푀푙표푎푑 is the torque due to the load, and 퐽푒 is the effective
inertia of the engine.
In this work, the transmission system is represented as in
the figure 3. For simplification purposes, the ”Transmission
System” block is composed only of several constants, de-
pending on the gearbox state.
1) The Admission and Intake Manifold: The temperature
푇푖푚 of the intake manifold is assumed to remain constant
due to the intercooler. Therefore, the analysis will be based
on essentially on the variation of the pressure. In this study,
the input flow is characterized by the output flow 푃푖푚 of the
compressor. In this study, the input flow is characterized by
the output flow 푚˙푐 of the compressor (see equation (3)).
푃˙푖푚 +
휏푣푉푑푁푒
120푉푖푚
푃푖푚 = 푚˙푐
푅푇푖푚
푉푚
(3)
Where 푉푖푚 is the volume of the intake manifold, 휏푣 is the
volumic efficiency, 푉푑 is the exchange volume in the engine,
푚˙푐 is the rotational velocity of the engine in rpm (푁푒 =
60푤푒
2휋 ).
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Figure 2. Engine Architecture, [10]
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Figure 3. Transmission block
2) The Indicated Torque 푀푖푛푑: In order to calculate the
indicated torque, we should calculate firstly the indicated
efficiency. Normally, this efficiency is a specific character-
istic to the engine and it is found from empirical data. This
efficiency is higher when the mixture is light, and it may be
approximated by (4).
휇푖푛푑 = 푎+ 푏휆+ 푐휆
2 (4)
The coefficients (푎, 푏, 푐) are found by identification (three
different tests have been made) and 휆 is defined by (5).
휆 =
푃푖푚푤푒푉푑
4휋푅 휏푣
푇푖푚푚˙푓
(5)
Then the indicated torque 푀푖푛푑 can be found as follows:
푀푖푛푑 = 푚푓푝푐푖휇푖푛푑 (6)
푝푐푖 is a characteristic for the diesel (40000000퐽퐾푔−1).
3) The Injection: The injection system controls the quan-
tity of fuel that will be introduced into the combustion
chamber. The mixture Air/fuel should be capable to auto
ignited by the effect of temperature and the high pressure.
The calorific power of combustion is related to the quantity
of fuel injected. The following model gives the flow of fuel
푚푓 in function of the accelerator pedal 푥푝 and the engine
speed (see equations (7) and (8)) [10].
푚˙푓 = 푖0 +Δ푚˙(푆퐷퐾) +Δ푚˙푓 (7)
Δ푚˙푓 = 푤푒(푖1 + 푖− 2푥푝 + 푖3푥
2
푝 + 푖4푤푒) (8)
Where 푖0 characterizes the minimal injection flow (greater
than zero, when the engine is idle), 푚푓 models the variations
of the flow around, 푖0, 푖1, ..., 푖4 are constants.
4) The Friction Torque 푀푓 : The friction torque may be
calculated by (9).
푀푓 =
(푐0 + 푐1푤푒 + 푐1푤
2
푒)푉푑
2휋푛푟
(9)
5) The Load Torque 푀푙표푎푑: The torque 푀푙표푎푑 depends
on the type of the road, the vehicle velocity, the turnings,...
In this work we will suppose that this torque is input to the
system and it has a constant value.
III. POSSIBLE FAULTS AND DIAGNOSIS
STRATEGY
In this section, we present the possible faults that may be
produced and diagnosis strategy realized.
A. Radar Data
1) Detection Performance: The basic data detection re-
quirement is to measure distance, relative speed, and reflec-
tion signal amplitude of moving and stationary objects in
three beams. Angular position is calculated by the interpo-
lation algorithms based on signal levels in adjacent beams.
2) Several Scenarios For the Radar Fault Detection Anal-
ysis:
i. First: if the radar is faulty and doesn’t detect any
object. So, without the help of another device, we can
do nothing.
ii. Second: if the radar works but gives incorrect dis-
tances (with a certain shift of 푥 meters): for example
(150 푚 → 150− 푥 푚) where 푥 is a constant term,
then, we cannot detect this fault.
iii. Third: if the relative velocity and the distance between
the vehicles are measured separately (two different
measurement tools), then it is important to check at
each period (for example 2 seconds) if the variation in
the distance corresponds to the variation in the relative
velocity. If there is a difference then we say that there
is a fault.
Ex: suppose that we initially have the relative velocity
푉푟푒푙 and the distance 푑 between the SDK truck and
the front vehicle 퐴푉 see figure 4, so if we consider
that the period (that we choose for checking) is equal
to 2 seconds, then we should obtain
푑(푡)− 푑(푡− 2) = 2 ∗퐴푣푒푟푎(푉푟푒푙)
Where 퐴푣푒푟푎(푉푟푒푙) is the average value of 푉푟푒푙 in the
period of 2 seconds.
iv. Fourth: Suppose that the radar was detecting a front
퐴푉 ; vehicle (see figure 4).
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Figure 4. SDK Vehicle and the front vehicle AV
Let 푉푟푒푙 be the relative velocity between the two vehicles
then: 푉푟푒푙 = 푉푎푣−푉 . As we have shown before, the relative
velocity is a measurement given by the radar. And also,
the SDK vehicle velocity 푉 is measured from other sensors
(wheels angular velocities or vehicle velocity), then we can
find the velocity of the 퐴푉 vehicle.
Getting the velocity of the front vehicle we can analyse
as follows:
If there is a strong sudden variation (and then its acceleration
(deceleration) is not realistic) then we have one of the two
following cases:
i. there is a fault in the radar sensor,
ii. the value of the SDK vehicle velocity is faulty,
iii. an intruder vehicle comes in front of the SDK vehicle
(see figure 5).
In all the above cases, it is important to observe the velocity
of the AV vehicle for several points before taking any
decision.
I n t r u d e rS D K A V
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Figure 5. SDK Vehicle and the front vehicle AV with intruders (vehicles)
In some of the above cases, the calculation of the AV
vehicle acceleration (deceleration), may give a non realistic
values. A study about the maximum (minimum) possible
acceleration (deceleration) can be given as follows:
∣푎푥∣푚푎푥 = max ∣
∑
퐹푥푖푗
푚
∣ = max ∣휇.푁푧
푚
∣ = max ∣휇.푚.푔
푚
∣
≤ 휇푚푎푥.푔
(10)
A maximum friction coefficient (휇푚푎푥) determines maxi-
mum acceleration or deceleration. It can be estimated using
sliding modes techniques as follows (see the following
section). Then if a non realistic acceleration (deceleration)
value is found, then if there is no intruder vehicle, we can
suppose that there is radar fault.
The overall diagnosis block for the Radar can be repre-
sented by the figure 6.
D i s t a n c e  f r o m
 t h e  r a d a r  s e n s o r s
R e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t y  f r o m
 t h e  r a d a r  s e n s o r s
T r u c k  v e l o c i t y  
F r o m  a n o t h e r  d i a g n o s i s  b l o c k
a  s i g n a l  p r e c e s i n g  i f  t h e  t r u c k  v e l o c i t y  i s  
f a u l t y  o r  n o t
R a d a r  f a u l t  
d i a g n o s i s  b l o c k
V e l o c i t y  o f  t h e  
f r o n t  v e h i c l e
D i a g n o s i s  
d e c i s i o n
Figure 6. Radar fault diagnosis block
B. 휇푚푎푥 Estimation
In order to estimate 휇푚푎푥, sliding modes observers can
be applied. A hierarchical observer is needed for this esti-
mation. In the first step, an observer based on the dynamical
equation of the wheels should be developed. This observer
takes as an input the applied motor torque (which is es-
timated statically (existing maps)) and the braking torque,
which can be easily found based on the hydraulic pressure
sent to the wheels [8]. Then, in parallel to this observer,
a sliding modes observer is used to estimate the vertical
forces. This observer is based on the suspension system
modeling [9]. Then by calculating the longitudinal force and
the vertical force we apply the following formula to estimate
the adherence coefficient:
휇푚푎푥 >
max(
∑푛
푖=1 퐹푥푖)
min(
∑푛
푖=1 퐹푧푖)
(11)
Where 푛 is the number of the wheels (equals to 6), 퐹푥푖 and
퐹푧푖 are respectively the longitudinal and the vertical forces
applied at the wheel 푖.
Table I
ANGULAR VELOCITY COMPARISON FOR THE WHEELS 1,3, 5
Difference 푤1 −푤3 푤1 − 푤5 푤3 − 푤5
푓표푑푑 푖 푓13 푓15 푓35
Table II
ANGULAR VELOCITY COMPARISON FOR THE WHEELS 2, 4, 6
Difference 푤2 −푤4 푤2 − 푤6 푤4 − 푤6
푓푒푣푒푛 푖 푓24 푓26 푓46
Table III
COMPARISON OF THE ANGULAR VELOCITY OF THE WHEELS: 1, AND 2,
4, 6
Difference 푤1 −푤2 푤1 − 푤4 푤1 − 푤6
푓1푖 푓12 푓14 푓16
C. Truck Velocity
The truck velocity used in the embedded SDK system is
found by calculating the mean value of the wheels angular
velocities. The truck velocity is an important decision term
for the SDK controller. So, in order to ensure that the truck
velocity value is not faulty, we analyze the rotational velocity
value of each wheel. A simple fault detection strategy (based
on the comparison between wheels velocities) aiming to
detect wheels angular velocities sensors fault is proposed.
To realise this study, two important steps are done:
1) A Simulator for the Truck Model: A Matlab Simulink
simulator representing the truck model is prepared. All the
equations presented previously in the paper are coded in this
simulator. The angular velocities of the wheels are found
by equations 1, where the motor torque is found based on
the angular velocity of the crank shaft (by a static map).
The braking torque also is an input to these equations.
This torque can be calculated based on the hydraulic brake
pressure sent to the wheel [8].
2) A Detection Strategy: Two cases are considered based
on steering angle:
i. Case of straight line motion: In this case, we suppose
that the angular velocities of the six wheels should
be approximately equal. Then in order to apply this
strategy, we suppose that we have two groups: group
1 (for the wheels: 1, 3, 5), and group 2 (for the wheels:
2, 4, 6), and we calculate the differences in the angular
velocities as shown in table I and table II. Then if
(푤푖 − 푤푗) < 휖, then we suppose that there is no
fault, and 푓푖푗 = 0, else we have a fault and 푓푖푗 = 1.
To localise the fault in the case of 푓푖푗 = 1, a small
algorithm is realized. This algorithm is able to localise
from 1 to 4 faults. In the case of more than four, it
gives a signal that all the wheels are faulty.
The realization of this algorithm is based on the
tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. By completing these tables, the
localisation of the fault will be evident.
Table IV
COMPARISON OF THE ANGULAR VELOCITY OF THE WHEELS: 3, AND 2,
4, 6
Difference 푤3 −푤2 푤3 − 푤4 푤3 − 푤6
푓3푖 푓32 푓34 푓36
Table V
COMPARISON OF THE ANGULAR VELOCITY OF THE WHEELS: 5, AND 2,
4, 6
Difference 푤5 −푤2 푤5 − 푤4 푤5 − 푤6
푓5푖 푓52 푓54 푓56
ii. Case of a curve motion: In this case, we follow the
same strategy proposed in the previous case, with the
five tables, but the main difference here, in the case
of the curve, is when we compare a wheel in group 1
(for the wheels : 1, 3, 5) to a wheel in group 2 (for the
wheels: 2, 4, 6, we should take in consideration a small
difference that can be calculated geometrically based
on the Ackerman angle theory and based essentially
on the steering angle. And then we should replace 휖
by 휖′.
In addition to the decision about faulty sensors, the truck
real velocity can be also calculated in this algorithm, this
velocity is the actual real velocity which is approximated
based on the non faulty sensors in the case that the number
of the faulty sensors is less than four.
IV. TEST CONDITIONS AND SIMULATION
ENVIRONMENT
First, mathematical models are validated by the company
Renault-Volvo Trucks (Lyon Section in France). Several
tests have been realized and the results were reasonable.
Then, the above functions and algorithms are coded in
the C language and implemented in the microcontroller
card (prepared by the company Serma Engineering). The
supervisor’s role is to treat all CAN messages, sent to it
in CANoe. From these messages, it retrieves information
required for diagnosis, applies the algorithm developed by
the global ECU and sends to other ECUs through Can-bus
network the diagnostic results and the counter-reactions. In
addition, in order to visualize the diagnosis results and the
supervisor activity, a PC interface is used by RS232 link. It
allows communication between the supervisor and a HMI
that displays progressively the information provided by the
supervisor.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have presented the architecture of the
SDK system, with simplified models for the Engine and
the wheels. A simplified strategy for the faults detection
and isolation is also presented. Based on the analysis that
we have done, we conclude that the proposed strategy for
the detection and the isolation of faults (especially wheels
angular velocities) may improve the performance of the SDK
system and increase its safety level.
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